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May 25, 2011
For More Information, contact:
Luther Strange
Joy Patterson (334) 242-7491
Alabama Attorney General
Suzanne Webb (334) 242-7351
Page 1 of 1


(MONTGOMERY) – Attorney General Luther Strange announced that the
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on Friday upheld the murder and arson
convictions of Ian Axyl Aitcheson. Aitcheson, 19, of Silverhill, was convicted by
a jury in Baldwin County Circuit Court in March of 2010 for the murder of his
father, Robert Aitcheson.

Evidence presented at trial stated that Ian Aitcheson, in concert with
others, entered Robert Aitcheson’s mobile home, put a plastic bag over his head,
put a pillow over his face, and stabbed him in the abdominal area with a kitchen
knife. The victim died from the wound to the abdominal area which perforated
his liver. Aitcheson and others then poured gasoline over the victim’s body and
throughout the mobile home and ignited the gasoline. Testimony at trial showed
that Aitcheson was involved in a gang, and that Robert Aitcheson’s murder may
have been part of a gang initiation for one of the codefendants. After Aitcheson
was found guilty by a Baldwin County jury, four other codefendants who had
some role in the murder entered pleas of guilt in the case.

The case was prosecuted at trial by the Baldwin County District Attorney’s
Office. Aitcheson was sentenced to life imprisonment for each conviction, and
subsequently sought to have his convictions reversed on appeal.

The Attorney General’s Criminal Appeals Division handled the case
during the appeals process, arguing for the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
to affirm the convictions. The Court did so in a decision issued on Friday, May

  1. Attorney General Strange commended Assistant Attorney General Marc
    Starrett of the Attorney General’s Criminal Appeals Division for his successful
    work in this case.

*For additional information regarding this case, a copy is attached of the
memorandum opinion of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals.

501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 (334) 242-7300
www.ago.state.al.us REL: 05/20/2011
Notice: This unpublished memorandum should not be cited as precedent. See Rule 54, Ala.R.App.P. Rule 54(d),
states, in part , that this memorandum “shall have no precedential value and shal l not be cited in arguments or
briefs and shal l not be used by any cour t within this state, except for the purpose of establishing the application
of the doctrin e of law o f the case, res judicata , collateral estoppel, double jeopardy, or procedura l bar.”
Court of Criminal Appeals
State of Alabama
Judicial Building, 300 Dexter Avenue
P. O. Box 301555
Montgomery, A L 36130-1555
Presiding Judge Clerk
J . ELIZABETH KELLU M Assistant Clerk
LILE S C. BURK E (334) 229-0751
J . MICHAEL JOINER Fax (334) 229-0521
CR-09-1269 Baldwin Circuit Court CC-09-1246
Ian Aitcheson v. Stat e of Alabam a
WINDOM, Judge.
Ian Aitcheson was indicte d for capita l murder during a
robbery, a violatio n of ß 13A-5-40(a)(2), Ala. Cod e 1975, and
fo r first-degree arson, a violatio n of ß 13A-7-41, Ala . Code 1975.
A jury convicted Aitcheson of intentiona l murder, a
violatio n of ß 13A-6-2, Ala . Code 1975, as a lesser-include d
offense of th e capital-murde r charge, and o f first-degre e
arson as charge d i n th e indictment . The tria l court sentenced
Aitcheson to lif e in priso n for each conviction and ordered
the sentences to ru n consecutively .
1 Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the
evidence adduced at tria l indicated that in the early morning
hours of January 28, 2009, Aitcheson, who was 16 years old at
the time, and three of his friends — Keishjuan Betts, Danny
Weaver, and Darlene Jerkins — drove to Silverhill where
Aitcheson’s father, Robert Aitcheson (“Robert”), lived in a
mobile home. They parked about a mile away from Robert’s
mobile home. Aitcheson, Betts, and Weaver then walked to
Robert’s mobile home with a gasoline can and an empty plastic
bag; Jerkins remained in the vehicle. When Aitcheson, Betts,
and Weaver arrived at the mobile home, Robert was on the sofa
watching television. Weaver jumped on Robert and held him
down while Betts put the plastic bag over his head and
Aitcheson put a pillow over his face. Aitcheson then
retrieve d a knif e from the kitchen and gave i t to Weaver, who
stabbed Robert in the abdominal area. Aitcheson and Weaver
then poured gasoline over Robert’s body and throughout the
insid e of the mobile home, and ignited the gasoline. The
subsequent investigation by the State Fire Marshall’s Office
confirmed that the fire was, in fact , the result of arson from
gasolin e being ignited and revealed that the point of origin
of the fire was in the living room where Robert’s remains were
found. In addition, an autopsy of Robert’s remains revealed
that he did not die from the fire — there was no smoke or
soot in hi s lungs — but instead died from the stab wound to
hi s abdomen that perforated hi s liver.
Betts testified against Aitcheso n at tria l and said that,
shortl y before the murder, he overheard Aitcheson talkin g with
Weaver and saying that “his dad was gonna lock him up” (R.
899) for stealing from him, and then whispering i n a “raspy”
voic e that he was going to kil l his dad. (R. 937). Betts
denied, however, that he knew that Aitcheson was going to kil l
hi s dad that night. The State also presented evidence that
jus t after the murder, Aitcheson telephoned Edgar Hambright
and told Hambright that he needed an alibi because he had
kille d someone. Aitcheson, Weaver, and Jerkins then dropped
Betts off at Betts’s girlfriend’s house and drove to
Hambright’s residence. Hambright testified that Weaver and
Aitcheson told him that they had killed Robert and burned
Robert’s mobile home. Testimony was presented that, in the
weeks preceding the murder, Aitcheson had stolen almost $3000
from Robert’s checking account as well as equipment from
Robert’s automobile repair shop in Gulf Shores. Testimony
2 als o indicated that Robert had given Aitcheson an ultimatum
only a day o r two befor e his death — eithe r straighte n up hi s
lif e and star t working to pay Robert back what Aitcheson had
stole n or Robert would report the theft s and have Aitcheson
arrested . Evidence also indicated that only one day after
Robert’s murder, on January 29, 2009, Aitcheson went to
Robert’s automobile repair shop and stol e two automobiles and
a motorcycle. Additional evidence indicated that in th e
vehicl e that was used the nigh t of th e murder , law-enforcement
officer s found envelopes containing soot. Finally, the State
presented evidence that Aitcheson was involved i n a gang, and
that Robert’s murder may have been part of a gang initiation
fo r Weaver.
On appeal, Aitcheson contends that the tria l court erred
i n denying his motio n to suppress statements he made to law –
enforcement officers and statements he made during a
conversatio n with his codefendant, Weaver, i n th e presenc e of
law-enforcement officers because they were al l obtained i n
violatio n of hi s juvenil e Miranda rights, see Miranda v.
Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and ß 12-15-202(a) and (b), Ala.
Code 1975, and the conversatio n with Weaver was inadmissible
hearsay and violate d his righ t to confrontation . This Court
disagrees .
The circumstances surrounding Aitcheson’s statements are
as follows. On the nigh t of January 29, 2009, Aitcheson was
taken into custody, transported to the Baldwin County
Sheriff’ s Department in Robertsdale, and placed in an
intervie w room where he was questioned for approximatel y two
and a hal f hours (hereinafter referre d t o as th e “interview”) .
The interview was recorded and identifie d at tria l as State’s
Exhibi t 62 and 62A. 1 This Court has reviewed State’s Exhibit
62 in it s entirety . The recording reflects that at
approximately 9:00 p.m., Aitcheson was advised of hi s juvenil e
1The full interview was initiall y identified as State’s
Exhibi t 62A. However, the State, before offering the
recordin g into evidence, voluntarily redacted the firs t 10
seconds of the intervie w (during which time i t wa s mentioned
that Aitcheson had previous experience with his juvenil e
Miranda rights) and identifie d the redacte d version as State’s
Exhibi t 62.
3 Miranda rights by Lawrence Griffith , an investigato r with th e
Baldwin County Sheriff’s Department. Aitcheson indicated to
Inv. Griffith that he understood his rights , and he agreed to
waive his right s and signed a waiver-of-rights form. Inv.
Griffit h testified at tria l that Aitcheson did no t appear to
be under the influenc e of any substances and tha t no promises
were made to Aitcheso n to persuade him to give a statement.
The recording supports Inv. Griffith’ s testimony. Inv.
Griffit h and Tony Nolfe, a lieutenan t wit h the Baldwi n County
Sheriff’ s Department, then questioned Aitcheson about hi s
father’ s death.
During the first hour of the interview, Aitcheson
continuall y denied any knowledge of his father’s death.
Approximately 40 minutes into the interview , Aitcheson asked
i f he could have codefendant Darlene Jerkins’s mother, Amber
Jerkins , with whom he was living at the time, with him, an d
Inv. Griffith told him tha t he could not becaus e she was no t
hi s mother. Aitcheson then asked i f h e could have hi s mother ,
Leis a Loffredi, present. No one answered Aitcheson, and th e
questionin g continued for anothe r 20 minutes, at which time
Aitcheson requested that hi s mothe r be present, specifically
referencin g the rights of which he had previously been
advised. Lt. Nolf e then contacted Loffredi and asked her t o
come to the office . However, after Loffredi was contacted,
the questioning continued for ove r an hour before Loffredi
arrived . During this hour, Aitcheson confessed that he was
present when Weaver stabbed his fathe r and when hi s father’ s
mobile home caught fire, but maintained that he did no t
activel y participate i n th e murde r and claime d that he di d not
know how the mobil e home caught fire.
Lt . Nolfe testified at one of the suppressio n hearings2
that Aitcheson’s mother arrived at approximately 10:45 p.m.,
he spoke with her “extensively ” abou t the situatio n and told
her that law-enforcement officers believed that Aitcheson had
participate d in hi s father’ s death, that Aitcheson had been
advised of hi s Miranda rights, and that he believed that
Aitcheson was not being entirely truthful about his
2As explained below, three separate hearings were held
outside the presenc e of the jur y regarding the admissibilit y
of Aitcheson’s various statements.
4 involvement in the crime. (R. 866.) The recording reflects
that while Lt. Nolfe was speaking with Aitcheson’s mother,
Inv. Griffith continued questioning Aitcheson and that at
approximately 11:05 p.m., Loffredi entered the room where
Aitcheson was being questioned and was allowed to speak with
him for a few minutes without any law-enforcement officers
present. However, Loffredi and Aitcheson were advised that
thei r conversation was being recorded.
Aitcheson then admitted to Loffredi that he was present
when Weaver stabbed his father but still maintained that he
di d not actively participate in the murder and knew nothing
about the fire. After a few minutes alone with his mother,
Lt . Nolfe and Inv. Griffith reentered the room and continued
questionin g Aitcheson in his mother’s presence for
approximately half an hour. During this time, Aitcheson again
denied knowing anything about how the fire started but
admitted that he had told several peopl e after the murder that
he had poured gasoline on his father’s body. Aitcheson
claimed that his statements in that regard were false. When
asked by his mother why he would say he poured gasoline on his
father’ s body i f he, in fact, had not done so, Aitcheson
simply responded that he did “a lot of things without
thinking. ” Aitcheson agreed to take the officers to the scene
and show them what happened and show them where he said Weaver
had disposed of the knife used to stab Robert.
Immediately following the interview, Lt . Nolfe and Inv.
Griffit h escorted Aitcheson and his mother to the area where
the crime occurred, and Aitcheson walked them through the
crime (hereinafter referred to as the “walk-through”). The
walk-through was recorded and identified at tria l as State’s
Exhibi t 63. This Court has reviewed the entirety of that
recordin g as well. During the walk-through, Aitcheson walked
law-enforcement officers from where he said Weaver had parked
the automobile, through the woods to his father’s mobile home.
He then explained what happened the night of the murder. The
recordin g reflects that at this point, Aitcheso n admitted that
Weaver had brought a gasoline can with him when they walked to
Robert’s mobile home, and Aitcheson stated fo r the first time
that he saw Weaver pour gasoline throughout the mobile home.
Aitcheson still maintained, however, that he did not
participat e in the murder or the fire.
5 Followin g the walk-through, Loffredi was advised that
Aitcheson would be taken back to th e sheriff’ s office where he
would be processed and then transported to jail . Lt. Nolf e
testifie d at one of the suppression hearings that he asked
Loffred i i f sh e wanted to retur n to th e sheriff’ s office with
Aitcheson, but Loffred i declined and asked to be taken home.
Before being taken home, Lt . Nolfe said, Aitcheson was allowed
to speak with Loffredi for a few minutes alone. Loffredi was
then taken home, and Aitcheso n was returned to the sheriff’s
office , where he was seated in a hallway in the crimina l
investigation s division while law-enforcement officers began
processin g him and arranging for hi s transpor t to jai l and
other law-enforcement officers were continuing to work on th e
case. Lt. Nolf e testified that while Aitcheson was waiting
fo r transport, he compared the notes of hi s intervie w with
Aitcheson with the notes of another investigator who had
interviewe d codefendant Danny Weaver and determined that
Aitcheson had failed during the interview to mention that
codefendant Keishjuan Betts was present and participate d in
the murder.
Lt . Nolfe said that he immediately approached Aitcheson
i n the hallway and asked him about Betts. At that point,
Michael Gaull, a sergeant in the criminal investigations
divisio n of the Baldwin County Sheriff’s Department who was
present in the hallway at the time, activated an audio
recorder he had on his person and began recording the
conversatio n (hereinafter referred to as the “hallway
conversation”) . The recording was identified at tria l as
State’s Exhibit 70, and thi s Court has listene d to i t i n it s
entirety . Just after the conversatio n began, Weaver, who had
been taken into custody at the same time as Aitcheson, was
brought into the hallway, and Weaver and Aitcheson began
talking . In addition , at variou s times throughout the hallway
conversation , different law-enforcement officers posed
questions to eithe r Weaver or Aitcheso n and elicite d answers.
Aitcheson admitted during the hallwa y conversation that he and
Weaver went to Robert’ s mobile home to ro b hi m and t o kil l him
i n order to kee p Aitcheson out o f priso n fo r th e theft s of hi s
father’ s money and equipment. Specifically, Aitcheson
admitted that on Monday, January 26, 2006, he had spoken with
hi s father and that they had argued about the thefts.
Aitcheson also admitted during the hallwa y conversation that
he had helped Weaver pour the gasolin e around the mobil e home
6 but still maintained that he had no idea how the mobil e home
caught fire. Aitcheson further stated that Betts was present
at the time of the murder and had put a plastic bag over
Robert’s head but claimed that he had forgotten Betts’s
presence during his previous interview because he was high on
crack cocaine at the time of the murder.
The record reflects that Aitcheson did not file a
pretria l motion to suppres s his statements. Rather, Aitcheson
waited until after the intervie w was admitted into evidence
and a portion of i t playe d for th e jury before moving to
suppress the interview, the walk-through, and the hallway
conversation . The State called Inv. Griffit h as it s 24t h
witness. After questioning Inv. Griffith about Aitcheson’s
being advised of hi s juvenile Miranda rights and establishing
that Aitcheson had waive d his rights voluntarily the nigh t of
January 29, 2009, the State offered into evidence State’s
Exhibi t 62, identifie d as “th e interview between Investigato r
Griffit h and [Lt. ] Tony Nolfe with the Defendant ” and moved
“t o publish i t to th e jury[.] ” (R. 834.) When asked by th e
tria l court i f ther e was “any objection, ” Aitcheson’s counsel
responded “No, sir, ” an d the tria l court then stated that
“State’s No. 62 wil l be admitted.” (R. 834.) The State then
played approximately the firs t hour of the intervie w fo r the
jury , at whic h point, the tria l court indicated that i t needed
a break and pu t th e jur y i n recess . According to th e record ,
the digital counter on the recordin g read 9:58 p.m. at th e
time i t was stopped by the tria l court for th e recess . This
was approximately one minute after Aitcheson had specificall y
asked for hi s mother’ s presence.
Afte r the break, but before the jur y was brought back
int o the courtroom, Aitcheson’s counsel objected to the
admission of any statements Aitcheson had made after he had
invoked his right to speak to hi s mother at approximatel y 9:57
p.m.3 — including the remainder of the two-and-a-half hour
interview , the walk-through , and the hallwa y conversation —
3Aitcheson’s counsel stated that he believe d Aitcheson’s
firs t reference to hi s mother, at approximatel y 9:40 p.m., was
ambiguous and “not a clea r request” and tha t hi s argumen t was
based solely on Aitcheson’ s unambiguous request for hi s mother
at approximately 9:57 p.m. (R. 836.)
7 arguing that anything Aitcheson said after the invocatio n of
that right should be suppressed because i t was taken in
violatio n of his juvenil e Miranda rights. Specifically,
counsel argued that Aitcheson should have been readvised of
hi s juvenile Miranda rights after his mothe r arrived, and i n
hi s mother’s presence, before any furthe r questioning. After
hearing initial arguments from the partie s and viewing the
entiret y of State’s Exhibit 62, the tria l court brought the
jur y back into the courtroom and recessed the jur y for the
A suppression hearing was then held and th e partie s made
furthe r arguments regarding the admission of Aitcheson’s
statements, and th e tria l court watched State’s Exhibit 63 -¨
the recording of the walk-through. At the request of th e
State, the tria l court then ordered the parties to file
writte n briefs arguing their respective positions. In hi s
brief , Aitcheson argued: (1) that all statements he made
during the intervie w (State’s Exhibit 62) between the time
that he requested his mother’s presence — at 9:57 p.m. — and
the time that he spoke with his mothe r — at 11:05 p.m. -¨
should be suppressed because they were obtained in violatio n
of his juvenil e Miranda right to speak to a parent; (2) that
al l statements he made after he spoke with his mothe r and i n
hi s mother’s presence — the las t half hour of the intervie w
(State’s Exhibit 62), an d al l statements he made during the
walk-through (State’s Exhibit 63) — should be suppressed
because his mothe r was not advised of hi s juvenil e Miranda
right s or given a writte n copy of those rights in accordance
wit h ß 12-15-202(d)(1) and (d)(2), Ala . Cod e 1975; and (3)
that all statements made during the hallway conversation
(State’s Exhibit 70) should be suppressed because hi s mothe r
was not present and he was not readvised of hi s juvenil e
Miranda rights and given an opportunity to eithe r waive or
invoke those rights. In it s brief , the State : (1) voluntaril y
agreed to redac t that portion of th e intervie w with Aitcheson
(State’s Exhibit 62) between the time that he requested hi s
mother’s presence — at 9:57 p.m. — and the time that he
spoke with his mother — at 11:05 p.m.; (2) argued that
Aitcheson’s statements made after he spoke with his mother and
while in hi s mother’ s presence — the las t half hour of th e
intervie w (State’s Exhibit 62), and al l statements he made
during the walk-throug h (State’s Exhibit 63) — were properly
admitted because Aitcheson had bee n both advised of, and given
8 the opportunity to exercise , his right to communicat e with his
parent; and (3) argue d that the totalit y of th e circumstances
surrounding the hallway conversation (State’s Exhibit 70)
indicate d that i t was voluntary.
When the tria l reconvened the followin g Monday morning,
a second suppression hearing was held outside the presenc e of
the jury regarding the admissio n of State’ s Exhibit 70 — th e
hallway conversation. Lt. Nolfe testified at tha t hearing as
follows :
“At the end of it , afte r the walk-through , we
tol d her [Loffredi] sort of – explained to he r what
the process was going to be as fa r as him being
taken into custody and where he would be
transported , et cetera , et cetera . And we offered
i f she would like to jus t ride with us because she
had ridden with us to the scene, that i f sh e would
lik e a ride back to the offic e until we got hi m
transported , and she said no. In fact, she would
lik e for u s to take her back to he r residence . So
we di d tha t with that being where we went and where
we dropped her off. “
(R. 863.) Lt. Nolf e said that Loffredi was never told that
Aitcheson would not be questioned further after being taken
back to th e sheriff’ s department. The tria l court then ruled
that that portion of Aitcheson’ s interview — State’s Exhibit
62 — from the tim e i t was stopped i n fron t of th e jur y (9:58
p.m. on the recording’s digital counter) until Loffredi
entered the room (11:05 p.m. on the recording’s digital
counter) would be suppressed and tha t the hallwa y conversation
— State’s Exhibit 70 — would also be suppressed. The trial
court di d no t issu e a specifi c ruling on th e admissibilit y of
the walk-through — State’s Exhibit 63 — that had bee n raised
i n Aitcheson’s brief in suppor t of hi s motio n to suppress.
The trial then continued with the last half hour of
State’s Exhibit 62 being played for the jury, and Inv .
Griffit h being questioned about the crime-scen e walk-through.
When the State offered into evidence the recording of th e
walk-through — State’s Exhibit 63 — Aitcheson’s counsel
state d “No objection, Your Honor.” (R. 879.) The recording
of the walk-throug h was then admitted into evidence and played
9 fo r the jury , after which a recess was taken.
During the recess , the Stat e requested an opportunity to
present evidence regarding the admissibilit y of the hallway
conversation . The trial court granted the request, but
instructe d the Stat e to questio n Inv. Griffith only up to th e
poin t that the hallwa y conversation took place, stating that
i t may reconsider the admissibilit y of that statement at a
late r time. The State then concluded questioning Inv.
Griffit h and calle d three more witnesses. The jury was then
release d for an overnight recess and another suppression
hearing was held outside the presenc e of the jur y regarding
the admissibility of th e hallwa y conversation. Following that
hearing, the tria l court reversed its earlie r decision and
hel d that the hallway conversation was admissible. The
followin g morning, Aitcheson filed another written brief
regarding the admissibilit y of th e hallwa y conversation, this
time raisin g hearsay and confrontatio n arguments regarding the
statements made by codefendant Weaver during the conversation .
The parties then argued those issues to the tria l court
outside the presence of the jury. The trial court ruled
against Aitcheson and hel d that the hallwa y conversation was
admissible . The State then called it s fina l two witnesse s and
State’s Exhibit 70 — th e hallwa y conversation — was admitted
int o evidence and playe d for th e jury.
“I t has long been the law that a confession is prima
faci e involuntary and inadmissible and that, before a
confessio n may be admitted into evidence, the burde n i s upon
the State to establis h voluntariness and a Mirand a predicate.”
Jones v. State, 987 So. 2d 1156, 1163 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006).
To establish a Miranda predicate, “the [S]tat e must show that
the defendant was advised of his rights , as required by
Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d
694 (1966), and it s progeny, and that the defendan t gave the
statement after making a voluntar y and knowing waiver of those
rights. ” Robinson v. State, 698 So. 2d 1160, 1162 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1996) (citations omitted). When the defendant is a
juvenile , the State must establish that the defendant was
properl y advised of hi s juvenile Miranda rights. See Anderson
v. State, 729 So. 2d 900 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998). Section 12-
15-202(a) and (b), Ala. Code 1975, provide:
“(a) Rights of the child when taken into
10 custody. When a child[4] is take n into custody, the
person taking the chil d into custody shall inform
the child of al l o f the following, in language
understandable to the child:
“(1) The reason that the child is
being taken into custody.
“(2) That the chil d has the right to
communicate with his o r her parent, legal
guardian, or lega l custodian whether or no t
that person is present. If necessary,
reasonable means will be provided for th e
chil d to do so.
“(3) The child has the right to
communicate with an attorney. If th e chil d
does not have an attorney, one will be
appointed for hi m or her . If th e chil d has
an attorney who i s no t present , reasonable
means shall be provided for th e chil d to
communicate with the attorney.
“(b) Rights of th e chil d before being questioned
while in custody. Before the chil d is questioned
about anything concerning the charge on which the
chil d was taken into custody, the person asking the
questions shall inform the chil d of the following
rights :
“(1) That the chil d has the right to
a child’s attorney.
“(2) That i f th e child is unable to
pay for a child’s attorney and i f th e
parent, legal guardian, or lega l custodian
of the child has not provided a child’s
attorney, one wil l be appointed.
“(3) That the chil d i s no t require d t o
4There is no dispute that Aitcheson was a “child” for
purposes of ß 12-15-202, Ala . Cod e 1975.
11 say anything and that anything the child
says may be used against the child .
“(4) That the child has a right to
communicate with his o r her parent, legal
guardian, or legal custodian, whether or
not that person i s present . If necessary,
reasonable means will be provided for th e
chil d to do so.
“(5) That even i f th e child’ s attorney
i s not present or has not yet been
appointed, the child has the right to
communicate with him or her and that, i f
necessary, reasonable means will be
provided for th e chil d to do so.” 5
Aitcheson pursues on appeal the same arguments he
presented to the tria l court in hi s two brief s in support of
hi s motion to suppress. First, he argues that al l statements
he made during the interview between the time that he
requested his mother’s presence — at 9:57 p.m. — and the
time that he spoke with his mothe r — at 11:05 p.m. — should
have been suppressed because, he says, they were obtained i n
violatio n of hi s juvenil e Miranda right to speak to a parent.
However, the record reflects that the tria l court granted
Aitcheson’s motion to suppress in par t and that this portion
of the intervie w was, i n fact , suppressed by the tria l court.
Therefore, Aitcheson has no adverse ruling from which he can
appeal. See Berryhill v. State, 726 So. 2d 2 97 , 302 (Ala .
Crim. App. 1998) (“This court will not review the merit s of a
motion presented by the appellant at tria l unless the court
below has issued a ruling adverse to the appellant on the
motion.”); Rice v. State, 611 So. 2d 1161, 1163 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1992) (“An adverse ruling is a prerequisite for
5Sectio n 12-15-202, Ala. Code 1975, became effective
January 1 , 2009, and Rule 11, Ala . R. Juv. P., which had
previousl y set out the rights of a child, was rescinded
effectiv e January 9, 2009. Section 12-15-202, Ala. Code 1975,
i s substantially the same as former Rule 11, Ala . R. Juv. P.
Therefore, caselaw applying former Rule 11 is equally
applicabl e to ß 12-15-202, Ala . Cod e 1975.
12 preservin g alleged error for appellat e review.”).
In addition, as explained above, although Aitcheson di d
move to suppress the intervie w during the trial , he di d s o
only after the interview had been admitted into evidence,
without any objectio n by him, afte r a portio n of th e intervie w
had been played for th e jury, and after a recess had been
taken. Therefore, Aitcheson’s motion to suppress was
untimely. See Fantroy v. State, 560 So. 2d 1143, 1144-45
(Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (motion to suppress photographs
untimely when motion made after photographs had alread y been
admitted into evidence). While a pretria l motion to suppress
i s not required , an objection must be made to the allegedly
illega l evidence at the time that evidence is offered at
trial . See Lewis v. State, 27 So. 3d 600 , 602 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2008) (“Although the bette r practice i s t o rais e a motion
to suppress before trial , we have held that ‘a pretria l motion
to suppress is not necessary, and that objection to the
introductio n of illegall y obtained evidence may be made fo r
the first time when illegall y obtained evidence i s offere d at
the trial.’ Biggs v. State,