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April 17, 2012
For More Information, contact:
Luther Strange
Joy Patterson (334) 242-7491
Alabama Attorney General
Suzanne Webb (334) 242-7351
Page 1 of 1


Attorney General Luther Strange announced that the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals on Friday upheld the murder conviction of Michael Dale Bonds and the two
reckless manslaughter convictions of Larry Craig McCluskey. Bonds, 31, of Double
Springs, was convicted in the Winston County Circuit Court in March of 2008 for the
murder of Jimmy Ingram. McCluskey, 37, of Jasper, was convicted in the Winston in
County Circuit Court in May of 2011 for the deaths of William and Doris Humphries.
In the Bonds case, the evidence presented at trial indicated that Bonds shot Jimmy
Ingram at a Double Springs gas station after the men had been having an extended quarrel
relating to child visitation matters. Bonds shot Ingram while Ingram’s three year old child
was present, then Bonds stood over Ingram while he was on the ground and shot Ingram
until Bonds ran out of ammunition. Ingram died from the gunshot wounds.
In the McCluskey case, the evidence presented at trial indicated that McCluskey
casued a fatal traffic collision that killed William and Doris Humphries, ages 82 and 78,
while McCluskey was under the influence of a controlled substance, methamphetamine.
The cases were prosecuted at trial by Winston County District Attorney John J.
Bostick’s office. Bonds was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and
as well a year imprisonment for an additional related conviction for reckless endangerment.
McCluskely was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for each manslaughter death, which
sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. Each of these defendants subsequently
sought to have their convictions reversed on appeal.

The Attorney General’s Criminal Appeals Division handled the cases during the
appeals process, arguing for the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals to affirm the
convictions. The Court did so in decisions issued on Friday, April 13.
Attorney General Strange commended Assistant Attorneys General William Dill and
Jack Willis of the Attorney General’s Criminal Appeals Division for their successful work in
these cases.
Note: For additional information regarding these cases, copies are attached of the decisions of the Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals.

501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 (334) 242-7300
www.ago.alabama.gov REL: 04/13/2012
Notice: This unpublished memorandum should not be cited as precedent. See Rule 54, Ala.R.App.P. Rule 54(d),
states, in part, that this memorandum “shall have no precedential value and shal l not be cited in arguments or
briefs and shal l not be used by any court within this state, except for the purpose of establishin g the application
of the doctrine of law of the case, res judicata , collateral estoppel, double jeopardy, or procedura l bar.”
Court of Criminal Appeals
State of Alabama
Judicial Building, 300 Dexter Avenue
P. O. Box 301555
Montgomery, A L 36130-1555
Presiding Judge Acting Clerk
SAMUEL HENRY WELC H (334) 229-0751
J. ELIZABETH KELLUM Fax (334) 229-0521
CR-10-0603 Winston Circuit Court CC-07-91
Michael Dale Bonds v. Stat e of Alabama
KELLUM, Judge.
The appellant, Michael Dale Bonds, was convicted of
murder, a violatio n of ß 13A-6-2, Ala . Code 1975, and reckles s
endangerment, a violatio n of ß 13A-6-24, Ala . Code 1975. The
circui t court sentenced Bonds to serve a term of life
imprisonment for th e murder conviction and 12 months’
imprisonment for the reckless-endangermen t conviction, with
those sentences ordered to be serve d concurrently. The circui t
court further ordered Bonds to pa y $50 t o th e crim e victims
compensation fund, $4,800 i n restitution , and cour t costs.
1 The evidence presente d a t tria l established the following
pertinent facts. Bonds and Meranda Shonta Ingram (“Shonta”)
had a chil d together when they were both teenagers. The child
was named Genesis, and fo r th e firs t 11 years of Genesis ‘
life , Bonds had nothin g to do with either Genesis or Shonta.
Bonds paid no chil d support and had ver y limited contact with
either Shonta or Genesis. When Genesis turned 11 years old ,
Bonds decided i t was time for hi m t o meet his daughte r and
become a par t of he r life . At thi s time, Shonta was marrie d t o
Jimmy Ingram.
Ingram had been married t o Shonta for almost 10 year s and
had raised Genesis since she was 3 months old. I n addition,
Ingram and Shont a had two childre n of thei r own, Makala Ingram
and Jay Patric k Ingram. When Bonds firs t suggested that he an d
Genesis start having a normal father-daughter relationship,
Ingram agreed that “Genesis ought to know her daddy , i f that’ s
what she wanted” and he di d no t attempt to stop Bonds from
entering the family’ s life. (R. 132.) However, Ingram was no t
happy with Shonta, Genesis and Bonds meeting without him
present. Shonta testified that “there was a lo t of tension”
during this time. (R. 196. )
Shortly after Bonds reentered Genesis’s life , Bonds and
Shonta started seeing each other again. Shonta was “running
around with [Bonds]” before her relationship with Ingram
ended. (R. 133). I n June 2006, Ingram and Shonta were
separated, and Shonta moved i n wit h Bonds.
Bonds’s relationship with Shonta created problems between
him and Ingram. Ingram started leaving threatening telephone
messages for Bonds and Shonta , stating that he would burn down
the house where Bonds and Shonta lived. Ingram later
threatened to beat or shoot Bonds and Shonta in another
telephone message. Shonta found i t necessar y to obtain a
restrainin g order against Ingram. Ingram also gave Genesis a
knife and tol d her t o stab Bonds i f he di d anythin g to her.
Around this time, Ingram slashed Bonds’s tires, scratched his
vehicle, and brok e hi s side view mirror. Shonta’s parents came
to Bonds’s house armed with a pisto l and a rifle . Shonta’s
parents left the pistol with Shonta so tha t she coul d protect
herself from Ingram. However, after Shonta and Ingram’s
divorce was finalize d i n o r about January 2007, things calmed
down between Bonds and Ingram.
2 After things calmed between Ingram and Bonds, Bonds’s
relationshi p with Shonta began to deteriorate. Ingram had
received custody of hi s children with Shonta , and thi s upset
Bonds because Shonta continued to speak with Ingram on a
regular basis. Bonds started threatening Shonta; he pushed
Shonta around and threw her acros s a bed because he thought
she and Ingram were talking too much. Around March 21, 2007,
Shonta attempted suicide, taking a combination of “muscle
relaxers, blood pressure medicines, and a pain medicine that
i s an opiate.” (R. 212.) Shont a testified that she attempted
suicide because “[Bonds] drove [her] crazy. ” (R. 212.) Shonta
moved out o f Bond’s house after the suicid e attempt and went
to live with her mother, Sheila Richie.
After moving in wit h her mother, Shonta started to se e
Ingram again. Genesis was also living with Shonta and Richie ,
but Bonds wanted to know when he would be able to see Genesis .
Shonta told Bonds that i t was up to Genesis , but “[Genesis ]
did not want to see him.” (R. 217.) Thi s made Bonds angry.
Bonds started making threats towards Shonta, telling her tha t
“i f he found out tha t [Shonta] was living in th e house with
his daughter with [Ingram] he would blow both of [them ] away.”
(R. 218.) On more than one occasion, Bonds told Richie that
“[Ingram] would never raise Genesis, that he would kill
[Ingram] first.” (R. 138. )
On Apri l 14, 2007, Ingram, Shonta, and thei r 3-year-old
son, Jay Patrick , went to th e Gatewa y grocery store i n Double
Springs where Richie planned to meet them. When Richie arrived
at the stor e she saw Bonds drive into the parkin g lot. Bonds
pulle d his vehicl e up behind hers, got ou t o f th e vehicle, and
angril y accused Richie of keepin g Genesis away from him. Bonds
was still arguing with Richie when Ingram, Shonta,
en Ingram, Shonta, and Ja y
Tl A- A -^ -.^ -.^ -! -r T ^ ^ r’^-^ ^ v-^ -I . ^^-1- ^-,-,-1- ^-P -r -r ^ ^-^ -! ^ 1 ^ -r T – ^ “
Patric k arrived. Shonta got ou t o f th e vehicl e and walke d over
her mother; without saying anything to Bonds, Shonta and
t o
hie entered the store . Ingram and Ja y Patric k subsequently
drove away and Bonds followed them.
When Richie and Shonta exited Gateway and pulle d out from
the parking lot, they saw Ingram and Bond’s vehicles parked a t
an adjacent gas station . Ingram was on the driver’ s side of
his vehicle arguing wit h Bonds who was on the passenge r side.
Jay Patrick was “on the hood of the car.” (R. 151.) When
Shonta and Richi e approached, Ingram tried to giv e Jay Patrick
to Richie, but as Richi e reached for the child , Bonds shot a t
3 After the firs t shots were fired and Ingram had falle n to
the ground, Bonds circled the ca r an d stoo d over Ingram. Bonds
then shot Ingram until he ran out of ammunition. Shonta
started doing CPR on Ingram and Richie ran into the gas
statio n to telephone 911. Richi e testified that Ingram was
unarmed at the time of the shooting.
Bonds started to walk off, then got back into his
vehicle. While Bonds was sitting in hi s vehicle , Jeremy
Dempsey, a friend of both Ingram and Bonds, pulled into the
gas station and approached Bonds’s vehicle. Bonds told
Dempsey, that “he (Bonds) shot [Ingram]” and the n Bonds handed
Dempsey the gun. (R. 366.) Bonds then got ou t o f the vehicl e
and walked back to where Ingram was lying on the ground and
“stomped on his head.” (R. 384.) As Bonds walked away he
turned towards Shonta, who was administering CPR, and sai d ” I
tol d you I would do it. ” (R. 233.) Ingram was shot si x times
and died as a result of hi s injuries.
Bonds’s defense theory was that his actions were
justifie d on the groun d of self-defense . Bonds put on evidenc e
at trial demonstrating the contentious relationship he had
with Ingram, that Ingram had made threats toward Bonds, and
that Bonds had filed charges against Ingram for criminal
mischief after Ingram damaged Bonds’s truck. Police testified
that Ingram and Bonds had been involved in a physical
altercatio n at a Mexican restaurant in Double Springs a few
months before the shooting and that Ingram was a “stand-up
fis t fight, kick i n th e rear-en d type of guy.” (R. 662.)
Bonds testified that on the day of the shooting he and
Ingram argued over Genesis. While they argued, Ingram stood i n
the door of hi s vehicle ; Bonds observed Ingram continuing to
look inside the vehicle , as i f ther e was something he wanted
i n the vehicle . Bonds thought thi s was strange so he went into
his vehicle and got hi s gun . When Bonds turned back to face
Ingram, Ingram jumped head first into his own vehicle. Bonds
then pulled up hi s gun and shot at Ingram. Bonds testified
that after firing at least one shot, he walked around the
vehicle to where Ingram was lying. After he noticed that
Ingram was stil l moving while on the ground , Bonds “shot again
… then walked up and kicked [Ingram] in the head.” (R.
Bonds’s case was tried before a jury. After both sides
had rested and the court had instructed the jur y on the
4 applicable principles of law — including the law of self-
defense — the jur y found Bonds guilty of murder i n th e death
of Ingram and guilt y of reckless endangerment because Bonds
had placed 3-year-old Jay Patrick in substantial risk of
serious injury when he shot in the child’ s direction.1 This
appeal followed.
The sole issue raised by Bonds on appeal is that the
circui t court erred i n denying his motio n for a judgment of
acquitta l because, he argues, “the Stat e failed to make out a
prima facie case of murder… because the State failed to
disprove that the killin g was done i n self-defense. ” (Bonds’s
brief , p. 1-2.)
The issue of whether Bonds’s killing of Ingram was
justifie d on the grounds of self-defens e i s a questio n of th e
weight of the evidence. Garraway v. State, 337 So. 2d 1349,
1353 (Ala. Crim . App. 1976) (“The weight and credence given th e
testimony of the accused as to the issu e of self-defens e i s a
question for the jury.”) . The weight of th e evidenc e refers to
whether the State’ s evidence i s palpabl y less persuasive than
the defense’s evidence. Living v. State, 796 So. 2s 1121, 1141
(Ala. Crim. App. 2000). To the extent that Bonds challenges
the weight of the evidence , we note that i t i s no t th e rol e of
thi s Court to reweigh the evidence on appeal. “The issue of
the weight to be afforded the evidence i s a question fo r the
jur y and thi s Court will not invade the provinc e of the jur y
by reweighing the evidence.” Living, 796 So. 2d at 1141
(citin g Pearson v. State, 601 So. 2d 1119, 1124 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1992)).
Regarding Bonds’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
State’s evidence, the rol e of thi s Court i s well-settled :
“‘”In determining the sufficienc y of the evidenc e to
sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept
as true al l evidence introduced by the State , accord
the State al l legitimat e inferences therefrom, and
consider al l evidenc e in a light most favorable t o
the prosecution.”‘ Ballenger v. State, 720 So. 2d
1033, 1034 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), quoting Faircloth
v. State, 471 485, 488 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984),
1Bonds does not appear to challenge hi s convictio n fo r
reckless endangerment on appeal.
5 aff’d , 471 So. 2d 493 (Ala. 1985). ‘”The tes t used
i n determining the sufficiency of evidence to
sustain a conviction is whether, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, a rational finder of fact could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.”‘ Nunn v. State, 697 So. 2d 497, 498 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1997), quoting O’Neal v. State, 602 So.
2d 462, 464 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). ‘”When there i s
lega l evidence from which the jur y could, by fair
inference, find the defendant guilty, the trial
court should submit [the case] to th e jury , and, i
such a case, this court will not distur b the tr i
court’s decision.”‘ Farrior v. State, 728 So. 2d
691, 696 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), quoting Ward v.
State, 557 So. 2d 848, 850 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).
‘The role of appellat e courts i s no t t o say what th e
facts are. Our role … i s t o judge whether the
evidence i s legall y sufficient to allow submission
of an issue for decisio n [by] th e jury. ‘ Ex parte
Bankston, 358 So. 2d 1040, 1042 (Ala. 1978).
“‘The trial court’s denial of a motion
for judgment of acquitta l must be reviewed
by determining whether there was legal
evidence before the jur y at the time the
motion was made from which the jur y by fair
inference could find the defendan t guilty.
Thomas v. State, 363 So. 2d 1020 (Ala. Cr.
App. 1978) . In applyin g this standard, this
court wil l determine only i f lega l evidence
was presented from which the jury could
have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Willis v. State, 447 So.
2d 199 (Ala. Cr. App. 1983) . When the
evidence raises questions of fact for the
jury and such evidence, i f believed , i s
sufficien t to sustain a conviction, the
denial of a motion for judgment of
acquitta l does not constitute error.
McConnell v. State, 429 So. 2d 662 (Ala.
Cr. App. 1983).'”
Gavin v. State, 891 So. 2d 907, 974 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003),
6 cert. denied, 891 So. 2d 998 (Ala. 2004) (quotin g Ward v.
State, 610 So. 2d 1190, 1191 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)).
A person commits the offense of murder if , “[w]ith intent
to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the
death of that person or of another person.” ß 13A-6-2(a)(1),
Ala. Code 1975. In a prosecution fo r murder, the intent of the
defendant “must be inferred by the jury from a due
consideration of al l of the material evidence.” Rivers v.
State, 624 So. 2d 211, 213 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
Contrary to Bonds’s assertion, the State presented
sufficien t evidence from which the jury could conclude that
Bonds murdered Ingram. Bonds had expressed an intent to kill
Ingram before the murder to both Shonta and Richie. There was
undisputed evidence presented at tria l that Bonds shot Ingram
repeatedly from a very close distance. After Ingram fell to
the ground, Bonds walked around Ingram’s vehicle, stood over
him, and continued shooting until his gun was out of
ammunition. After emptying his weapon, Bonds then “stomped” on
Ingram’s head. The record indicates that Ingram was not armed
and could not have defended himself against Bonds’s attack.
This Court’s duty is to determine whether there was
legall y sufficient evidence to support Bonds’s conviction for
murder. See Gavin, 891 So. 2d at 974. The State presented
ample evidence indicating that Bonds murdered Ingram, thus
presenting a question for the jury’s determination. The jury
weighed the evidence and found Bonds guilty of murder. It i s
not this Court’s responsibility to reweigh the evidence.
Accordingly, no basis for reversal exists regarding this
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court
i s affirmed.
Windom, P.J., and Welch, Burke, and Joiner, JJ., concur.
7 REL: 04/13/2012
Notice: This unpublished memorandum should not be cited as precedent. See Rule 54, Ala.R.App.P. Rule 54(d),
states, in part, that this memorandum “shall have no precedential value and shall not be cited in arguments or
briefs and shall not be used by any court within this state, except for the purpose of establishing the application
of the doctrine of law of the case, res judicata, collateral estoppel, double jeopardy, or procedural bar.”
Court of Criminal Appeals
State of Alabama
Judicial Building, 300 Dexter Avenue
P. O. Box 301555
Montgomery, AL 36130-1555
Presiding Judge Acting Clerk
SAMUEL HENRY WELCH (334) 229-0751
J. ELIZABETH KELLUM Fax (334) 229-0521
CR-11-0068 Winston Circuit Court CC-09-399
Larry Craig McCluskey v. State of Alabama
KELLUM, Judge.
The appellant, Larry Craig McCluskey, was indicted by a
Winston County grand jury for two counts of reckless murder,
a violation of ß 13A-6-2(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975; two counts of
counts of reckless manslaughter, a violation of ß 13A-6-
3(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975; two counts of homicide by vehicle,
driving under the influence, a violation of ß 32-5A-192, Ala.
Code 1975; two counts of homicide by vehicle, driving on the
wrong side of the road, a violation of ß 32-5A-192, Ala. Code
1975; and one count of criminally negligent homicide, a
violation of ß 13A-6-4, Ala. Code 1975. These charges arose
1after McCluskey caused a fatal traffic collision that killed
William and Doris Humphries while he was driving under the
influence of a controlled substance. Following a jury trial,
McCluskey was convicted of two counts of reckless manslaughter
and four counts of vehicular homicide. However, the circuit
court dismissed the vehicular homicide convictions as
duplicitous, lesser-included offenses. The circuit court
sentenced McCluskey to 20 years’ imprisonment for each of the
reckless manslaughter convictions and ordered the sentences to
run consecutively. The circuit court further ordered McCluskey
to pay a $15,000 fine, $17,015.36 in restitution, and court
costs. This appeal followed.
McCluskey contends that the circuit court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss the six counts in the indictment
that alleged he was driving under the influence of a
controlled substance when he caused the fatal traffic
collision. Specifically, McCluskey contends that the State’s
failure to comply with the circuit court’s discovery order
requiring the State to reveal the specific controlled
substances relied on to support the charges was prejudicial,
and that the suppression of this exculpatory evidence was in
violation of Brady v. Maryland.
Rule 16, Ala. R. Crim. P., governs discovery in criminal
cases. Failure to comply with this rule is viewed with
disfavor and is condemned. Morrison v. State, 601 So. 2d 165
(Ala. Crim. App. 1992). The rule places the remedy for
violations within the sound discretion of the trial court, and
to support a claim for reversal of the exercise of that
discretion, the accused must show prejudice to substantial
rights. McLemore v. State, 562 So. 2d 639 (Ala. Crim. App.
1989). Moreover, “[t]he trial court is in the best position to
determine whether its discovery orders have been complied
with, and we will not reverse its decision on discovery
matters unless a clear abuse of discretion has been shown.”
Smith v. State, 698 So. 2d 189, 208 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996).
The record indicates that on September 2, 2010, McCluskey
filed a “Motion to Produce and Motion in Limine.” (C. 21.) In
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2that motion, McCluskey acknowledged that he was injured in the
traffic collision that resulted in the deaths of William and
Doris Humphries. McCluskey, who was treated at a hospital for
his injuries, stated, “as a result of said treatment [he] was
administered certain controlled substances which would render
him incapable of safely driving.” (C. 22.) Because McCluskey
believed that admittance into evidence of any post-accident
controlled substance would be highly prejudicial, he requested
that the State provide, prior to trial, “the controlled
substance or substances which the State of Alabama alleges
[he] was under the influence [of] prior to the accident which
rendered him incapable of safely driving.” (C. 22-23.)
The circuit court granted McCluskey’s discovery request,
ordering the prosecutor “to respond to [the] discovery request
contained herein no later than 30 days prior to trial.” (C.
21.) On November 16, 2010, McCluskey filed a “Motion in Limine
and Motion to Dismiss” in which he argued that because the
State had not provided the description or name of the
controlled substance it alleged he was under the influence of,
all of the counts in his indictment that mentioned his being
under the influence of a controlled substance should be
dismissed. (C. 26.)
On May 16, 2011, the circuit court conducted a hearing on
McCluskey’s “Motion in Limine and Motion to Dismiss.”
According to the transcript of the hearing, the State did not
directly respond to McCluskey’s discovery request regarding
controlled substances, but instead provided the medical
records from McCluskey’s stay at the hospital. According to
those records, there were numerous substances found in
McCluskey’s blood that could have impaired his ability to
drive, but only three — methamphetamine, marijuana, and
Diazepam (Valium) — were determined by the State’s expert to
be unrelated to McCluskey’s medical treatment while at the
hospital. McCluskey also had an independent expert review his
medical records to determine what medications were related to
his medical treatment. (C. 21.)
During the hearing, the circuit court heard arguments
from the State and McCluskey, and the circuit court questioned
John Posey, McCluskey’s first trial counsel who started
preparing for trial before he was later replaced by Dale
Jones. The following exchange occurred during the hearing:
3″[THE COURT]: Do you recall specifically any
discussions with the DA about methamphetamine and
“[Posey]: I do recall your Honor, the district
attorney making a remark that methamphetamine was
not a drug that is — “
“[THE COURT]: Administered by a hospital. He
said that in here [the court room] with you standing
before the Court, and I recall that as well.”
(R. 128.) The circuit court then tried to determine whether
Posey had relayed to Jones that the State was going to pursue
methamphetamine as the controlled substance when he turned
over the representation of McCluskey. Posey stated his
communication with Jones was, “extremely limited.” (C. 144.)

After this exchange, the circuit court denied McCluskey’s
motion, stating:
“I’m going to deny your motions, and this is the
reason why: I have been in this circuit as a judge
for eight years. I have never required, nor have I
ever had an attorney to expect written responses on
discovery because that is humanly impossible to
accomplish in any case. The DA has a number of cases
to handle. I got with him early on when I took
office and I said, ‘look, open book. We’re not going
to have any trial by ambush.’ And for you to come in
here this morning and try to state and assert to the
Court that you’re being ambushed, that you were
unaware of the fact that the State — I say ‘fact,’
that the clear indication that the State is going
after the meth as opposed to the Lidocaine or
anything else … I find it totally implausible that
you could claim that you’ve been ambushed by the
“I can tell you that based upon what I’ve heard
here today in the courtroom, what I personally
recall myself involving this — and I remember when
4you mentioned the snide remark [the State] made
about the meth, which was a clear indication where
he was going. I mean, if you want a road map, a
written road map, you’ve got it. I certainly did,
and you know a lot more about — y’all know a lot
more about the facts of this case.
“Any assertion by you that you’re being ambushed
is ludicrous. Any assertion by you that you expected
and should have gotten written responses to your
discovery request is equally, in this circuit,
ludicrous. And I am also going to rule that under
your Motions in Limine I think number one, two three
four, and five are hereby denied.”
(R. 145-48.) After this motion was denied the trial proceeded,
and the State used methamphetamine and marijuana as the
specific controlled substances to support the charge of
driving under the influence of a controlled substance.
As discussed above, “[t]he trial court is in the best
position to determine whether its discovery orders have been
complied with, and we will not reverse its decision on
discovery matters unless a clear abuse of discretion has been
shown.” Smith 698 So. 2d at 208 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996). The
transcript of the hearing on the motion in limine and the
record on appeal indicate that the circuit court did not abuse
its discretion when it determined that the State’s failure to
provide McCluskey with the specific controlled substances it
relied on to support a conviction for reckless manslaughter
did not warrant dismissal of any charges. McCluskey was
provided with medical records that demonstrated his blood
contained methamphetamine and marijuana, two drugs that were
clearly not administered by first responders or hospital
workers to treat his injuries after the vehicle collision. In
addition, there was ample discussion between the district
attorney and McCluskey indicating that the State was going to
rely on methamphetamine and marijuana such that no prejudice
resulted from the failure of the State to provide a written
response to the circuit court’s discovery order. Because the
circuit court’s ample explanation for its denial of
McCluskey’s motion to dismiss is supported by the facts and
5the record of this case, the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied McCluskey’s motion to dismiss.
McCluskey’s argument that the State violated the rule of
Brady v. Maryland when it did not comply with the circuit
court’s discovery order is also without merit.
“‘”In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. [83] at 87, [83
S.Ct. 1194 at 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) ], the
Supreme Court held that ‘the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.’ To establish a Brady violation,
defendant must show that (1) the prosecution
suppressed evidence, (2) the evidence suppressed was
favorable to the defendant or was exculpatory, and
(3) the evidence suppressed was material to the
issues at trial. Ex parte Kennedy, 472 So. 2d 1106
(Ala. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 975, 106 S.Ct. 340, 88 L.Ed.2d 325.”
Mitchell v. State, 706 So. 2d 787, 805 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997).
The purpose of the Brady rule is “not to provide a defendant
with complete disclosure of all evidence in the State’s file
which might conceivably assist him in the preparation of his
defense,” but instead is meant to ensure the defendant is not
denied access to exculpatory evidence known to the State but
unknown to the defense. McMullin v. State, 442 So. 2d 155, 158
(Ala. Crim. App. 1983)(quoting United States v. Ruggiero, 472
F. 2d 599, 604 (2nd Cir. 1973)).
In the instant case, it cannot be said that the State
denied McCluskey access to exculpatory evidence. The circuit
court noted that the State had an open-file policy, allowing
McCluskey to review the file and have access to whatever non-
privileged information it contained. This file included the
medical records which indicated that McCluskey had two illegal
drugs in his blood stream at the time of the car accident. The
State provided McCluskey with the evidence that it intended to
use at trial in accordance with Brady. Therefore, the circuit
court did not abuse its discretion in denying McCluskey’s
Brady claim.
McCluskey also contends that the circuit court erred in
refusing to grant a mistrial because, McCluskey argues, a
State witness provided testimony about controlled substances
other than methamphetamine and marijuana that were present in
McCluskey’s blood sample. Specifically, McCluskey argues that
this testimony directly contradicted the State’s assertions to
the circuit court and McCluskey that the witness would discuss
only methamphetamine and marijuana.
The record indicates that the State was assisted by Dr.
Jack Kalin, Chief of the Alabama Department of Forensic
Science. Dr. Kalin helped the State determine which controlled